More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives by Lahaie, Sébastien et al.
 
More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions:
Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Lahaie, Sébastien, Florin Constantin, and David C. Parkes. 2005.
More on the power of demand queries in combinatorial auctions:
Learning atomic languages and handling incentives. In
proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence: July 30-August 5, 2005, Edinburgh,
Scotland, ed. A. Saffiotti, L. Pack Kaelbling, 959-964. Denver,
C.O.: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence.
Published Version http://www.ijcai.org/
Accessed February 18, 2015 1:58:40 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4031553
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAMore on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions:
Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives
S´ ebastien Lahaie Florin Constantin David C. Parkes
Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
fslahaie, ﬂorin, parkesg@eecs.harvard.edu
Abstract
Query learning models from computational learn-
ing theory (CLT) can be adopted to perform elic-
itation in combinatorial auctions. Indeed, a re-
cent elicitation framework demonstrated that the
equivalence queries of CLT can be usefully sim-
ulated with price-based demand queries. In this pa-
per, we validate the ﬂexibility of this framework
by deﬁning a learning algorithm for atomic bid-
ding languages, a class that includes XOR and OR.
We also handle incentives, characterizing the com-
munication requirements of the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves outcome rule. This motivates an extension
to the earlier learning framework that brings truth-
ful responses to queries into an equilibrium.
1 Introduction
There has been a burst of recent attention in the problem of
preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions (CAs), which
are auctions in which agents can express values on bun-
dles of items [Blum et al., 2004; Lahaie and Parkes, 2004;
Conen and Sandholm, 2001; Santi et al., 2004; Parkes, 2002].
Indeed, elicitation is today recognized to be just as important
a computational problem (and perhaps more so) as that of
winner-determination [Nisan and Segal, 2004]. CAs can po-
tentiallyrequireagents(e.g. people, ﬁrms, automatedbidding
agents) to value an exponentially large number of different
bundles of indivisible goods, when determining the value on
even a single bundle can be hard [Sandholm, 1993].
In query-based elicitation [Parkes, 2002; Conen and Sand-
holm, 2001], agents must be able to respond to simple
queries, such as identifying a preferred bundle at given
prices, or providing the value of a speciﬁed bundle. Many
of these methods are closely related to the “exact learn-
ing with queries” model from computational learning theory
(CLT) [Blum et al., 2004]. In fact, these are typically learning
methods in their own right because they elicit valuations en-
tirelyandexactly. OneexceptionisLahaieandParkes[2004],
whogiveapreferenceelicitationschemethatavoidscomplete
learningwhenpossible. Themaincontributioninthatpaperis
to explain how to simulate any learning algorithm with mem-
bership and equivalence queries as an elicitation algorithm
with value and demand queries.
We extend this earlier work by providing a preference elic-
itation scheme for a broad class of languages, called atomic
languages, which includes XOR and OR as special cases
(see Nisan [2000] for a formal study of bidding languages).
In addition to validating the ﬂexibility of the Lahaie and
Parkes [2004] framework, our new algorithm demonstrates
the power of demand queries. For instance, we know of no
learning algorithm for OR using just value and equivalence
queries.
Our main contribution is to characterize the communica-
tion requirements of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) out-
comerule[Jackson, 2000]. Alreadyknowntobesufﬁcientfor
determining the VCG outcome [Mishra and Parkes, 2004],
we provehere that anyelicitation protocol for theVCG mech-
anism necessarily also determines a set of “universal com-
petitive equilibrium” (UCE) prices. This result broadens our
understanding of demand queries, demonstrating that if the
goal is to verify a VCG outcome it is necessary to verify an
efﬁcient allocation and set of UCE prices, which can be done
through a simple extension of demand queries to universal
demand queries.1 We demonstrate how to extend the exist-
ing learning framework to terminate with UCE prices and an
efﬁcient allocation.
With n agents, a na¨ ıve way to handle incentives is to
simply run the preference elicitation algorithm, and then run
it again n more times with each agent removed. This yields
enough information to derive VCG payments. However, the
UCE-based characterization motivates a design for an exten-
sion of the learning-based framework that we call Learner
Extend and Adjust (LeEA), that obtains VCG payments in a
single run of the algorithm.
Related Work. Nisan and Segal [2004] characterize the
minimal communication requirements of implementing an
efﬁcient allocation, but do not consider incentives. The
large literature on ascending-price Vickrey auctions (see
Parkes [2004] for a survey) is largely motivated by issues of
costly elicitation, and recent auctions are designed to termi-
nate with UCE prices [Mishra and Parkes, 2004]. Similarly,
1This is not to say that elicitation algorithms for VCG based on
demand queries are necessarily efﬁcient. Indeed, in some cases
demand-query based algorithms are known to be exponentially-
inefﬁcient [Nisan and Segal, 2004]. However, it is at least suggestive
that demand queries are powerful in general.Conen and Sandholm [2002] had previously considered elic-
itation methods that terminate with the VCG outcome. What
is new in our work is the proof that UCE prices are necessary
(as well as sufﬁcient) for the VCG outcome, together with the
careful integration of this methodology into elicitation meth-
ods with polynomial query complexity.
2 Preliminaries
The purpose of a CA is to allocate a set G of m distinct and
indivisible goods among a set N of n agents, each with a val-
uation vi : 2G ! R. Let Γ be the set of possible allocations,
in which no good is given to more than one agent. We aim
for an efﬁcient allocation S¤ = (S¤
1;:::;S¤
n), namely an al-
location that maximizes total value
Pn
i=1 vi(S¤
i ). By deﬁni-
tion, agent valuations satisfy the property of no externalities,
meaning that an agent only cares about its own bundle, and
not those allocated to other agents. Valuations also satisfy
free-disposal, meaning that vi(S) · vi(T) if S µ T, are
normalized: vi(;) = 0, and bounded, so that there is a con-
stant K > 0 (known to the center) such that vi(S) < K for
all S µ G and all i 2 N. Agents have quasi-linear utility
functions, so that agent i’s utility for a bundle S at prices p is
ui(S;p) = vi(S) ¡ p(S).
2.1 Bidding Languages
A bidding language is used to encode and communicate real-
valued functions over bundles; this may for instance be an
agent’s entire valuation function, or an underestimate of its
true valuation function (as in bids in ascending-price CAs,
hence the name “bidding language”). In this work, the center
also uses bidding languages to quote prices to the agents.
Formally, a bidding language consists of syntax and se-
mantics that allow one to encode value information and in-
terpret these encodings. We consider the class of atomic lan-
guages. An atomic representation is a pair (B;w) where B µ
2G is a set of bundles (the atomic bundles), and w : B ! R¸0
is a real-valued function over these bundles (the values of the
atomic bundles). An alternate useful syntax is a list of atomic
bids, where an atomic bid is a bundle-value pair (S;x), and x
is to be interpreted as the value of bundle S µ G. The seman-
tics of an atomic language L are deﬁned through the evalua-
tion function ÁL(¢;B;w) that extends w to the set of all bun-
dles, so that the value of a bundle S is v(S) = ÁL(S;B;w).
A well-formed atomic language evaluation function satisﬁes
the following conditions:
L1. ÁL(B;B;w) = w(B) for all B 2 B.
L2. ÁL(S;B;w) = ÁL(S;BjS;w) for all S µ G, where
BjS = fT 2 B j T µ Sg.
L3. ÁL(S;B [ B0;w) ¸ ÁL(S;B), for all B;B0 µ 2G and
all S µ G.
As an important example, consider the family of lan-
guages fLkgm
k=1. The evaluation function for language
Lk is Ák(S;B;w) = maxS2Dk(S;B)
P
B2S w(B), where
Dk(S;B) deﬁnes the set of all S µ 2B that satisfy (i) jSj · k,
(ii) [B2SB µ S, (iii) B1 \ B2 = ; for B1;B2 2 S s.t.
B1 6= B2. We call elements of Dk(S;B) decompositions
of S into atomic bundles from B. It is easy to see that Ák
satisﬁes conditions L1-L3 above. As special cases we have
L1 = XOR and Lm = OR.
A bidding language is expressive for CAs if it can encode
all valuation functions v : 2G ! R¸0 that satisfy free dis-
posal. It is not hard to see that L1 (XOR) is expressive, but
that Lk for k > 1 are not (consider for example the valua-
tion that places a value of 1 on all bundles). Representation
(B;w) in a language L of valuation v is minimal if jBj is min-
imized over all valid L representations of v. In what follows,
sizeL(v) denotes the size of a minimal L representation of
function v, when such a representation exists.
2.2 Queries
Agents are modeled as “black-boxes” that can respond to
queries. A response to a query provides partial information
about an agent’s valuation function. We adopt queries that
are more or less natural in economic settings:
Value query. A value query VALUE(S) to agent i on bundle
S asks the agent to report its exact value vi(S).
Demand query. A demand query DEMAND(S;p) presents
an agent i with a bundle S and prices p over all bundles (in
some bidding language). The agent replies YES if bundle S
is a best-response at prices p, meaning that vi(S) ¡ p(S) =
maxTµG [vi(T) ¡ p(T)]. Otherwise the agent replies with a
bundle S0 that makes it strictly better off than S at prices p,
i.e. vi(S0) ¡ p(S0) > vi(S) ¡ p(S).
Universal demand query. A universal demand query UNI-
DEMAND(S1;:::;Sn;p) presents an agent i with prices p
over all bundles together with a set of n bundles S1;:::;Sn
(not necessarily distinct). The agent replies YES if every bun-
dle presented is a best-response to prices p. Otherwise, the
agent responds with an index j and a bundle S0 such that
vi(S0) ¡ pi(S0) > vi(Sj) ¡ pi(Sj).
Note that ; may be a valid response to a demand query.
Also note that prices are general functions p : 2G ! R¸0,
and may be nonlinear (bundles are priced, not just items
alone) and non-anonymous (different agents may face a dif-
ferent price for the same bundle).
2.3 CE and UCE Prices
CAs, and the preference elicitation scheme we consider here,
generally operate by converging to a competitive equilibrium.
This ensures that the ﬁnal allocation is indeed efﬁcient.
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium among agents N is
an allocation S¤ = (S¤
1;:::;S¤
n) together with prices p that
satisfy: (1) S¤
i 2 argmax
SµG
[vi(S) ¡ pi(S)] for i = 1;:::;n
and (2) S¤ 2 argmax
S2Γ
Pn
i=1 pi(Si).
If (S¤;p) constitutes a CE, we call p the CE prices and say
that prices p support allocation S¤. For our results later on
incentives, we also need the following concept:
Deﬁnition 2 A universal competitive equilibrium is an
allocation-price pair (S¤;p) that constitutes a competitive
equilibrium among agents N, and such that (S¤
¡i;p) con-
stitutes a competitive equilibrium among agents Nnfig, for
some efﬁcient allocation S¤
¡i of items G among agents
Nnfig, for all i 2 N.In fact, it is not hard to show that prices p that support some
efﬁcient allocation S¤
¡i among agents Nnfig for all i 2 N
also support all such efﬁcient allocations.
3 A Learning-Based Architecture for
Elicitation
The learning framework of Lahaie and Parkes [2004] (that we
call ‘Learner’) converts individual exact learning algorithms
into preference elicitation algorithms. We will demonstrate
how to instantiate it here for the class of atomic languages.
The goal of a learning algorithm for our purposes is to ex-
actly determine an unknown target valuation v represented in
a given bidding language L in a number of queries that scales
polynomially with sizeL(v) and m. Let V be the space of
possible valuations, in our case all bounded and normalized
valuations that satisfy free-disposal and have no externalities.
Exact learning in the computational learning theory liter-
ature typically uses membership and equivalence queries. A
membership query in our domain is just a value query. Learn-
ing algorithms maintain a manifest valuation ˜ v, which is their
current estimate of the target function. On an equivalence
query we present ˜ v to the agent; it replies YES if ˜ v = v,
and otherwise replies with some counterexample S such that
˜ v(S) 6= v(S).
Lahaie and Parkes [2004] note that for a multi-agent sce-
nario, learningalgorithmscanberuninparallelforeachagent
while they perform value queries. Demand queries play a key
role in coordinating learning across agents. When all agents
require the response to an equivalence query, one can instead
compute an efﬁcient allocation ˜ S¤ and supporting CE prices
˜ p with respect to the current manifests, and present these to
the agents as demand queries. Call these the manifest allo-
cation and the manifest prices. If all agents reply YES, we
have reached a CE and ˜ S¤ is already efﬁcient; we need not
learn any more information. Otherwise, the responses to the
demand queries are in fact counterexamples that can be re-
turned to the learning algorithms as responses to their equiv-
alence queries.
In the case of a speciﬁc bidding language, such as an
atomic language, we need to provide means to: (1) learn a
target valuation in the given bidding language; (2) compute
an efﬁcient allocation with respect to manifests (i.e. solve
winner-determination); (3) compute supporting CE prices.
3.1 Learning Atomic Languages
We now describe a learning algorithm with value and demand
queries for atomic languages.2 The manifest valuation ˜ v is
stored as pair ( ˜ B; ˜ w). Let (B;w) be the minimal L represen-
tation of target valuation v. The manifest representation will
always satisfy (1) ˜ B µ B, and (2) ˜ w(B) = w(B) for B 2 ˜ B.
This is true initially because we set ˜ B = ;. Throughout the
learning process we will ensure that only elements B 2 B
2Notethatitisperfectlyalrightforindividuallearningalgorithms
to use demand queries in the Learner framework. In simulating these
algorithms, we just need to be clear which demand queries can be
performed asynchronously and in parallel, and which queries need
to be performed on all agents simultaneously.
are ever added to ˜ B, and we make value queries on these new
additions to appropriately set ˜ w(B). From these conditions
and L3 we get that ˜ v(S) · v(S) for all S µ G at all times,
and see that ˜ v underestimates v.
The outer-loop of the learning algorithm issues
DEMAND(;; ˜ v), i.e. with prices quoted equal to the cur-
rent manifest and in the same bidding language. If the
response is YES we are done since 0 · v(S) ¡ ˜ v(S) · 0 for
all S µ G. Otherwise we obtain a more-preferred bundle
S that is a counterexample (this follows from a simple
adaptation of Lemma 1 in Lahaie and Parkes [2004]). We
then have 0 < v(S) ¡ ˜ v(S) = ÁL(S;B;w) ¡ ÁL(S; ˜ B; ˜ w).
By property L2 this means there is at least one undiscovered
atomic bundle B 2 BjS n ˜ BjS. To derive the atomic bundle
B from S, we use the subroutine presented as Algorithm 1.
Recall that K is an upper-bound on agent values.
Algorithm 1 ﬁndNewAtomic(S)
Construct prices pS where
pS(T) :=
½
K if T 6½ S
˜ v(T) otherwise
Issue DEMAND(;;pS)
if the agent replies YES then
return S
else if the agent replies with bundle R then
return ﬁndNewAtomic(R)
end if
The prices pS in this subroutine can be constructed in the
atomic language as (Bp; ˜ wp), as follows. First, initialize
Bp = ˜ B with ˜ wp = ˜ w. Then, add atomic bids (S;K) and
(fjg;K) for all j = 2 S to complete the representation. The
size of this construction is clearly polynomial in sizeL(v)
and m. Finally, we then update our manifest by adding
(B; ˜ w(B)), where B is the atomic bundle discovered in Al-
gorithm 1 and ˜ w(B) is obtained via a value query, and con-
tinue. This is correct by property L1. The correctness of the
algorithm follows directly from this lemma:
Lemma 1 On performing query DEMAND(;;p) in Algo-
rithm 1, if the reply to the demand query is YES then S is an
atomic bid, and otherwise the bundle returned R is a subset
of S and also a counterexample to ˜ v.
Proof. If the agent replies YES, then it must be that
˜ v(R) = v(R) for all R ½ S, because ˜ v always underes-
timates v. In particular, we have ˜ v(B) = v(B) for each
B 2 BjS, and every atomic bundle B ½ S has been dis-
covered by the minimality of (B;w) and condition L2. Then,
it must be that S 2 B is a new atomic bid since ˜ v(S) 6= v(S).
If instead bundle R is returned then R ½ S by the structure
of the prices (all other bundles are priced at K). Moreover, as
v(R) > p(R) = ˜ v(R), we have a new counterexample. 2
Note that this subroutine is called at most sizeL(v) times
since a new atomic bundle is returned each time. Also, ob-
serve that Algorithm 1 makes at most m demand queries,
because we always recurse on strict subsets of the original
argument S and jSj · m.Theorem 1 An unknown target valuation v in any atomic
language L can be learned with at most sizeL(v)¢(m+1)+1
demand queries and at most sizeL(v) value queries.
This algorithm is efﬁcient for atomic languages and pro-
vides the ﬁrst polynomial query learning algorithm for the
OR language. OR can be more concise than XOR although it
is not always expressive [Nisan, 2000]. We do not know of a
learning algorithm for OR with membership and equivalence
queries alone, so this result suggests the power of demand
queries. In this context, demand queries are used to provide a
kind of “focused” equivalence query in which an agent’s new
counterexample is restricted to being a subset of the current
counterexample.
3.2 Computing CE Prices for Lk
In this section we explain how to compute the manifest allo-
cation and prices for language Lk. It is useful to work with
the explicit structure of Lk, although we intend this to be
suggestive of an approach that is workable for any atomic
language. We ﬁrst describe a generalized mixed-integer pro-
gram (MIP) for winner-determination (WD), which will also
be revelant for computing CE prices. All mathematical pro-
grams deﬁned in this section can be readily solved with MIP
solvers such as CPLEX.
Assume agent i’s manifest is represented in language Lki.
The program description takes ﬁve arguments: (1) a set of
agents N0 µ N; (2) a vector of bundles S, with one bun-
dle Si for each agent i 2 N0; (3) a vector of sets of atomic
bundles B, with one set Bi for each agent i 2 N0; (4) val-
ues wi(B) for each agent over all atomic bundles B 2 Bi;
(5) prices pi(B) for each agent over all atomic bundles B 2
Bi. Let ri = jBij. Let Γi µ 2
˜ Bi be the possible allo-
cations to agent i (sets of pairwise disjoint atomic bundles
with cardinality at most ki). An allocation here is a vector
° = (°1;:::;°n) where °i 2 Γi for each agent i 2 N. The
generalized formulation WD(N0;S;B;w;p) is as follows:
max
aij;e¯i;zi
X
i2N0
"
ri X
j=1
wi(Bij)aij ¡ zi
#
s:t:
ri X
j=1
aij · ki 8i 2 N
0 (1)
X
i2N0
X
fj:Bij3gg
aij · 1 8g 2 G (2)
e¯i ¸ 1 ¡ jfj : Bij 2 ¯igj +
X
fj:Bij2¯ig
aij
8¯i 2 Γi
8i 2 N
0 (3)
zi ¸
X
fj:Bij2¯ig
pi(Bij)e¯i
8¯i 2 Γi
8i 2 N
0 (4)
X
fj:Bij3gg
aij = 0
8g 62 Si
8i 2 N
0 (5)
aij 2 f0;1g; e¯i 2 f0;1g; zi ¸ 0
Let ~ B = ( ˜ B1;:::; ˜ Bn), ~ G = (G;:::;G) (with n en-
tries), ˜ w = ( ˜ w1;:::; ˜ wn) (the values in agent manifests), and
~ 0 = (0;:::;0) (with n entries).3 The usual program to solve
winner-determination is WD(N; ~ G; ~ B; ˜ w;~ 0).4 Let v¤ be the
value of the efﬁcient allocation obtained through WD. The
linear program (LP) to obtain CE prices is as follows.
min
¼s;¼i;pi(Bij)
¼
s
s:t: ¼
s ¸
n X
i=1
X
fj:Bij2°ig
pi(Bij) 8° 2 Γ (6)
¼i ¸
X
fj:Bij2¯ig
˜ wi(Bij) ¡
X
fj:Bij2¯0
ig
pi(Bij)
8i 2 N
8S µ G
8¯i;¯
0
i 2
Dk(S;Bi)
(7)
¼
s +
n X
i=1
¼i = v
¤ (8)
¼
s ¸ 0; ¼i ¸ 0; pi(Bij) ¸ 0
Variables ¼i can be interpreted as the utility to each agent
from their allocations at the prices computed, and variable
¼s as the revenue to the seller. This formulation has an ex-
ponential number of utility-maximization constraints (7) and
revenue-maximization constraints (6). To address this we can
use delayed constraint generation [Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis,
1997]. We only keep a subset of these constraints (initially
empty), and obtain speciﬁc values for each of the variables in
the LP. To check whether any implicit constraints of type (6)
are violated, we solve WD(N; ~ G; ~ B;~ p;~ 0), where ~ p is the vec-
tor of prices obtained from the LP. If the solution to this is
greater than ¼s, we add the constraint of type (6) that cor-
responds to the allocation obtained by this auxiliary integer
program.
Similarly, we can run WD(fig; ~ G; ~ B; ˜ w;~ p) for each agent
i to see if we need to generate any constraints of type (7),
and check whether the result is greater than ¼i. Note that
each such integer program has an exponential number of con-
straints of type (3) and (4). To use delayed constraint gen-
eration for these, we can run WD(fig;(:::;Si;:::); ~ B;~ p;~ 0)
as an auxiliary program, where Si is the solution to the main
integer program. If the solution to this program has value
greater than zi, we must generate corresponding constraints
of type (3) and (4).5
4 Communication Requirements of
Implementing the VCG Outcome
In the above discussion, we set aside the issue of incentives
in preference elicitation. A reliable elicitation scheme must
also induce the agents to truthfully reveal their preferences.
Suppose that instead of implementing the ﬁnal CE prices
3The function 0 is identically 0 over all bundles.
4In this case, constraints (3) are irrelevant because they only
serve to activate e¯i if appropriate atomic bundles are selected, to
indirectly ensure that zi is set to the correct price through con-
straint (4), and the price here is always 0. Similarly constraints (5)
are irrelevant because any agent can be allocated any bundle.
5Note that this last program is the usual one the proxy would use
to determine the value or price of a bundle, given the Lk representa-
tion of its agent’s manifest valuation.obtained by Learner, we provide a payment of
P
i6=j vi(S¤
i )
to agent j for all j 2 N, where (S¤
1;:::;S¤
n) is the efﬁcient
allocation (agent values are available via value queries). As
NisanandSegal[2004]pointout, thisalignseachagent’sutil-
ity with the overall objective, and truthful revelation becomes
an ex post Nash equilibrium of the elicitation protocol. How-
ever, this scheme is clearly very costly for the center. The
center pays the agents! The cheapest payment scheme that
aligns the agents’ individual incentives with economic efﬁ-
ciency is the VCG payment [Krishna and Perry, 2000].
In this section, we may drop the assumption of no exter-
nalities so that our results hold with greater generality. Valu-
ations and prices are therefore deﬁned over entire allocations.
Let Vi be the set of possible valuations for agent i. A state is
a valuation proﬁle v 2 V = V1£:::£Vn. An outcome in our
scenario is an element of O = Γ£Rn, namely a speciﬁcation
of the allocation and the agents’ payments.
The objective is to implement the Vickrey outcome rule,
which is a correspondence F = (F1;F2) : V ³ O mapping
states v 2 V to pairs (ˆ °;q) such that ˆ ° is an efﬁcient allo-
cation for proﬁle v and (q1;:::;qn) is the associated vector
of VCG payments. Letting ˆ °(v) 2 argmax°2Γ
P
i2N vi(°)
and ˆ °¡j(v) 2 argmax°2Γ
P
i6=j vi(°), the VCG payments
(from the agents to the center) are deﬁned as:
F2j(v) =
X
i6=j
vi(ˆ °¡j(v)) ¡
X
i6=j
vi(ˆ °(v)) for j 2 N
Mishra and Parkes [2004] have shown that to compute
VCG payments it is sufﬁcient to obtain UCE prices. In fact,
we show here that it is not only sufﬁcient but necessary that a
communication protocol for VCG discover UCE prices.6
We consider nondeterministic communication protocols.
This is the setting in which a center claims the VCG outcome
is (°;q), and must send messages to each agent to convince
them of this outcome. Each agent checks that the message is
valid given the semantics of the protocol and its private type,
and if all respond YES the protocol has veriﬁed the outcome.
Deﬁnition 3 [Nisan and Segal, 2004] A nondeterministic
communication protocol is a triple Π = hW;¹;gi, where W
is the message set, ¹ : V ³ W is the message correspon-
dence, and g : W ! O is the outcome function, and the
message correspondence ¹ has the following properties:
² Existence: ¹(v) 6= ; for all v 2 V.
² Privacy preservation: ¹(v) =
T
i ¹i(vi) for all v 2 V,
where ¹i : Vi ³ W for all i 2 N.
Protocol Π realizes choice correspondence F : V ³ O if
g(¹(v)) µ F(v) for all v 2 V.
Let r = jΓj be the size of the (ﬁnite) set of allocations. De-
note the set of universal price equilibria in state v by E(v),
where E : V ³ Γ £ Rnr denotes the universal price equilib-
6The proof of this result, together with the associated deﬁnitions,
closely follows the developments by [Nisan and Segal, 2004] who
show that CE prices are necessarily revealed when a (nondetermin-
istic) communication protocol computes an efﬁcient allocation.
rium correspondence.7 The proof of the following is straight-
forward and omitted in the interest of space.
Lemma 2 Let hW;¹;hh;qii be a nondeterministic commu-
nication protocol that realizes the Vickrey outcome rule F.
Let w 2 W and let ˆ ° = h(w). If v;v¤ 2 ¹¡1(w), then
F2(v) = F2(v¤), where the VCG payments are with respect
to efﬁcient allocation ˆ °.
We note in particular that F2j(w) is entirely independent
of component vj in the original proﬁle v. Thus if v¡j;v¤
¡j 2
¹
¡1
¡j(w), then F2j(v) = F2j(v¤).
Theorem 2 Communication protocol Π = hW;¹;hh;qii re-
alizes the Vickrey outcome rule F if and only if there exists
an assignment p : W ³ Rnr of prices to messages such
that protocol Π0 = hW;¹;hh;pii realizes the universal price
equilibrium correspondence E.
Proof. As mentioned, Mishra and Parkes [2004] provide the
proof of sufﬁciency. Suppose protocol hW;¹;hh;qii realizes
Vickrey outcome rule F. For each w 2 W, let ˆ ° = h(w),
and let pi(°) = supvi2¹
¡1
i (w)[vi(°) ¡ vi(ˆ °)] for all i 2 N
and ° 2 Γ. Note that ˆ ° is directly obtained from the in-
formation generated by Π, but state v and efﬁcient alloca-
tions in the marginal-economies ˆ °¡j(v) for j 2 N are not.
However, we do not need to explicitly compute this infor-
mation to implement a universal price equilibrium accord-
ing to Deﬁnition 2. Let q(w) be the VCG payments asso-
ciated with efﬁcient allocation ˆ ° = h(w). The ﬁrst part
of the proof of necessity, which shows that prices p are CE
prices, is proved by Nisan and Segal [2004]. We will show
that the prices p just constructed are in fact UCE prices cor-
responding to ˆ °, that are valid for all v 2 ¹¡1(w). Fix agents
i 6= j. By Lemma 2, any two v¡j;v¤
¡j 2 ¹
¡1
¡j(w) lead to the
same VCG payment. Hence we obtain
P
i6=j[vi(ˆ °¡j(v)) ¡
vi(ˆ °)] = supv¡j2¹
¡1
¡j(w)
P
i6=j[vi(ˆ °¡j(v)) ¡ vi(ˆ °)], which
holds for all v¡j 2 ¹
¡1
¡j(w) (call this equation (I)). By
privacy preservation we can write the right-hand side as
supv¡i;j2¹
¡1
¡i;j(w)
P
h6=i;j[vh(ˆ °¡j(v))¡vh(ˆ °)]+pi(ˆ °¡j(v)).
By deﬁnition pi(ˆ °) = 0, so Equation (I) gives: [vi(ˆ °) ¡
pi(ˆ °)]¡[vi(ˆ °¡j(v))¡pi(ˆ °¡j(v))] =
P
h6=i;j[vh(ˆ °¡j(v))¡
vh(ˆ °)]¡supv¡i;j2¹
¡1
¡i;j(w)
P
h6=i;j[vh(ˆ °¡j(v))¡vh(ˆ °)]. The
right-hand side is at most 0, so ˆ °¡j(v) is utility-maximizing
for all agents i 2 N at prices pi. The ﬁnal step is
to establish that ˆ °¡j(v) is a revenue-maximizing alloca-
tion among agents Nnfjg. By privacy preservation, the
supremum on the right-hand side of equation (I) can be
brought within the summation. Using our price construc-
tion and rearranging, this yields:
P
i6=j pi(ˆ °¡j(v)) = P
i6=j[vi(ˆ °¡j(v)) ¡ vi(ˆ °)] ¸
P
i6=j[vi(°) ¡ vi(ˆ °)], for
all ° 2 Γ. This holds for all v¡j 2 ¹
¡1
¡j(w), so P
i6=j pi(ˆ °¡j(v)) ¸ supv¡j2¹
¡1
¡j(w)
P
i6=j[vi(°) ¡ vi(ˆ °)] =
P
i6=j supvi2¹
¡1
i (w)[vi(°) ¡ vi(ˆ °)] =
P
i6=j pi(°), for all
7This correspondence only maps states to personalized prices
and efﬁcient allocations, and not to efﬁcient allocations in the
marginal-economies with each agent removed. It is implied that the
prices also support efﬁcient allocations in the marginal-economies.v
1
v
2’
v
2’’
g’’ g g’ G
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Figure 1: Constructing UCE prices.
° 2 Γ, where the ﬁrst equality follows by privacy preser-
vation. This completes the proof. 2
Figure 1 gives the intuition behind this result for the case
with two agents. Given a message w, the ﬁgure shows all
valuationsthatareconsistentwithw foragent1(hereonlyv1)
and for agent 2 (v0
2 and v00
2). The valuations are normalized
so that the efﬁcient allocation ° has value 0. The conditions
for a CE require that all of agent 1’s valuations consistent
with w be above all of agent 2’s valuations consistent with w.
To construct valid CE prices, we take the envelopes of agent
1 and 2’s valuations (lower and upper, respectively). Since
agent 2’s valuations are all consistent with the same VCG
payments, they all peak at the same level. This ensures that
the construction also satisﬁes the constraints of a UCE.
4.1 Using Universal Demand Queries: LeEA
A na¨ ıve way to compute VCG payments is simply to run the
protocol once with all agents, then once with each agent re-
moved for a total of n + 1 runs. We would then determine
the value of the efﬁcient allocation in each run. This gives us
sufﬁcient information to compute VCG payments. But given
this new characterization result, we can instead modify the
general elicitation framework to converge to UCE prices. We
call this new framework Learner Extend and Adjust (LeEA).
In the ﬁrst stage we run the standard Learner, until CE prices
and an efﬁcient allocation are determined. The second stage
uses universal demand queries. Whenever all the individual
learning algorithms are stalled waiting to perform an equiv-
alence query, we determine manifest allocations in the main
economy (with agents N) and also in each of the marginal
economies (with agents Nnfjg, for all j). In addition, we de-
termine (manifest) universal CE prices, p. We can then issue
query UNI-DEMAND(Bi;p) to each agent i, where Bi is the
vector of bundles currently allocated to the agent in the main
economy and in each of the marginal economies, for j 6= i.
If all agents reply YES, we have a UCE and can derive and
implement VCG payments. Otherwise, we obtain counterex-
amples to push forward the individual learning algorithms.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented novel applications of demand queries and
demonstrated how they can be used in elicitation other than as
parallels to equivalence queries. Speciﬁcally, we provided a
learning algorithm that uses demand queries with specialized
prices for the class of atomic languages, a generalization of
the OR and XOR languages. We also showed how demand
queries can be used in a CA setting to make truthful bidding
an ex post Nash equilibrium: we modify an elicitation pro-
tocol to converge to UCE prices by using universal demand
queries, which are a simple generalization of demand queries.
Indeed, we proved that UCE prices are necessarily implicitly
discovered in any VCG protocol.
In future work, it would be useful to ﬁnd a learning al-
gorithm for the OR
¤ bidding language [Nisan, 2000]. OR
¤
representations are similar to OR representations except that
they also allow dummy (phantom) items, that impose restric-
tions on which atomic bundles can be combined together.
This bidding language can represent many natural valuations
concisely but lies outside our class of atomic languages. As
opposed to the Lk languages, knowing the atomics in an OR
¤
representation(withoutthedummyitems)doesnotfullychar-
acterize all the valid atomic decompositions of a bundle. It is
the structure generated by dummy items that must also be
learned. In addition, we would like to completely charac-
terize the relative power of demand and equivalence queries.
We conjecture that demand queries are strictly more powerful
than equivalence queries.
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